Hayleys PLC (A):

Focusing on Corporate Responsibility

This case was written by Mark Hunter, Adjunct Professor, and Luk Van Wassenhove, Professor of Operations Management, the Henry Ford Chaired Professor of Manufacturing, and Academic Director of INSEAD Social Innovation Centre. It is intended to be used as a basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation. Opinions, facts and commentary not attributed to Hayleys PLC or its employees are the sole responsibility of the authors.

Copyright © 2009 INSEAD

To order copies of INSEAD cases, see details on the back cover. Copies may not be made without permission.
N.G. “Tanky” Wickrematne, Chairman and CEO of Hayleys PLC, looked around the conference room at the managers of his holding company’s different businesses – tea and rubber plantations, textile and rubber products factories, luxury hotels, logistics, water and gas purification systems, and more. Together they formed one of Sri Lanka’s leading multinational firms, accounting for no less than 2.6% of the country’s export income, with revenues of LKR 31 billion (Sri Lankan rupees) or US$300 million in 2007-8.

In 1978, the 100th anniversary of the firm’s founding, company revenues had been just US$10 million. Despite a civil war that had claimed 65,000 lives since 1983, rampant inflation, and the devastation and 30,000 deaths caused by the tsunami of 2004, Hayleys had continued to grow at a double-digit annual rate. Tanky reflected, “Hayleys’ business really started in the last 30 years, when it grew into the US$300 million firm it is today.” Simultaneously, the company had seen a transformation from its roots as a trading company into an industrial and services conglomerate.

By the early 21st century, Hayleys was also recognised by its Sri Lankan peers and the public for its high social and ethical standards. Its disclosure practices had repeatedly won the national Best Corporate Report Award, and Hayleys had also won the Best Corporate Citizen Award from the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce in 2004.¹ That year, Tanky’s predecessor as Chairman, Rajan Yatawara, had set up and chaired a “corporate responsibility cluster” within management to bring together various sustainability initiatives across the group. Tanky commented, “We began to realise that there were many aspects of the way Hayleys have been doing business which could be leveraged to provide marketing value.” G. Kavindra “Kavi” Seneviratne, Managing Director of Hayleys subsidiary Kelani Valley Plantations PLC (KVPL), explained.²

“We saw marketing guys using words like ‘CSR’, ‘environment’, catch phrases – and we thought, ‘We’re already doing all this and getting no benefit. Let’s do a company-wide thing – define it, get the best practices for all the businesses, what managers are doing, and do it as one company.’”

Tanky’s managers – nearly all of whom, like himself, had spent their working lives at Hayleys – were deeply proud of the policy. Looking at them he thought: “Much of this effort has come from each sector, out of their own drive.” But he was obliged to ask, for the group and its shareholders, whether corporate responsibility policies were economically sustainable. Upheavals in Sri Lanka and the global economy made that question even more urgent.

Was corporate responsibility helping to build Hayleys and strengthen it in a difficult time, he wondered, or was it a more or less costly distraction from the firm’s real business? What, in fact, were the true costs and benefits of this policy? And what were the risks if, for some

---

¹ The award for corporate reporting was given by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Sri Lanka. The Ceylon Chamber of Commerce gave the “Best Corporate Citizen Award” for the first time in 2004, and Hayleys won it for three successive years.

² KVPL’s recent history is the subject of Case B4, “Mabroc Kelani Valley Teas: Creating “The World’s Ethical Tea Brand”.
reason, the policy was seen as a failure or as “greenwashing”\(^8\) at home or abroad? Tanky waited to hear what his managers would say.

**The Sri Lankan Context**

Sri Lanka, or “resplendent island”, rises off the southeast coast of India. From coastal plains to mountain peaks adorned by spectacular waterfalls, the 65,000 km\(^2\) land mass, home to 21 million people, was known as Ceylon until 1972. Despite intense cutting of choice hardwoods, 30% of the land is still covered by forest. Another 17% of the territory is devoted to agricultural crops, in particular tea, rubber, tobacco and coconut palms. Ceylon tea, first imported to the island in the mid-19\(^{th}\) century, is today recognised as the world’s flavour standard, commanding a steep premium in commodity and consumer markets over teas from competitors such as Kenya and China.\(^4\)

The first known settlements – of Sinhalese immigrants from India – date from the fifth century BC. Two centuries later, Hindu Tamils from southern India arrived. Much later, Arab traders visited Ceylon, importing their Muslim faith. Over the centuries there was intermittent war between the Tamils, based in the North and East, and the mainly Buddhist Sinhalese for control of the island. Colonisation began with the Portuguese in 1505, then the Dutch in 1658, and finally the British in 1796. Beginning in the mid-19th century, the British brought more Tamils from India to work on tea and rubber plantations; they now represent around 9% of the population. The Sinhalese remained the predominant (74%) ethnic group.

Tamils and Sinhalese united in 1948 to win the status of a self-governing dominion within the Commonwealth. In 1956, Sinhalese nationalists imposed Sinhalese as the official state language, and Buddhism was singled out for state support. Many Sri Lankans of every ethnicity later denounced these policies. In 1972, the year that Ceylon became the independent Republic of Sri Lanka,\(^5\) a group called the New Tamil Tigers (later renamed Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or LTTE) launched an armed insurgency. When they killed 13 soldiers in 1983, anti-Tamil riots followed and civil war ensued.

The conflict quickly became international, as the leadership of the Tamil Nadu state of southern India and the Indian national government, as well as Tamil expatriate communities around the world supported the Tigers. In 1991, the assassination of Indian Prime Minister

---

3 In Sri Lanka, allegations that CSR was merely a cover for unethical practices by business firms had already appeared, and were a major reason that Hayleys preferred to use the phrase “corporate responsibility” instead. Suspicion surrounding CSR in Sri Lanka reached a climax at the end of 2008 when a corporation that was a major promoter of the concept admitted to “mismanagement” of a major financial subsidiary, and its chairman was charged with fraud. At the international level, denunciations of greenwashing, “the act of deliberately deceiving customers about the environmental practices of their company or green aspects of their products” (quoted from www.brandcurve.com/when-brands-fake-being-green/), were becoming very loud indeed. See http://www.greenwashingindex.com/ for a list of firms condemned for the practice.

4 Sri Lanka is the world’s third producer of tea, with annual production of 304 metric tons. India and China combined produce about 1,600 metric tons. In 2008, the average auction price in Colombo was US$3.06/kg; the nearest competitor on the world market sold for US$2.33/kg. (Source: Sri Lanka Tea Board, Ministry of Plantation Industries, presentation in Colombo, October 20, 2008).

5 In 1978, the name was changed to the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka.
Rajiv Gandhi by a female member of the LTTE cost the Tigers their Indian ally. In subsequent years the Tigers assassinated a Sri Lankan president (and wounded another) and several government ministers, as well as moderate leaders of the Tamil community. They also killed civilians in settings that included the historic Buddhist shrine of Kandy to the airport in the capital Colombo, using weapons from assault rifles to car bombs. Police and army abuse of Tamils also occurred, sustaining the Tigers’ international activism.

Recurrent negotiations and truces failed over the Tigers’ demands for a separate nation. When a ceasefire was declared in 2002, they controlled both the North and the East. Then, after the conflict erupted again, they were forced back to their northern strongholds. In 2008, the government launched a final assault on the Tigers, amidst rising international concern for the protection of civilians and appeals from allies to negotiate a political solution. The LTTE was defeated in May 2009, but major issues remained. Leaders of the nation’s business community wanted peace between Sri Lanka’s different ethnicities. So did the nation’s trade unions and journalists, who had endured pressures from both sides in the conflict. Meanwhile, the government’s economic policies fed “a deadly combination of high inflation, high interest rates and an appreciating exchange rate,” observed Hayleys management. In Sri Lanka, corporate responsibility would also have to mean contributing to national reconciliation and reconstruction.

The Making of a Sri Lankan Multinational

The firm that became Hayleys PLC was formed in 1878 by an Englishman, Charles Pickering Hayley, to trade in coconut fibres. (The firm still manufactures brushes, mats and other products from the same raw material). His partners and successors expanded step by step into the retailing, import and export of industrial and agricultural goods, shipping and warehousing. To this day, trading and distribution are important activities. The firm distributes agricultural inputs and consumer products from major US, European and Japanese firms (see Exhibit 1).

In the 1970s, Hayleys diversified into manufacturing; first agricultural machinery and chemicals, and then activated carbon from coconut shells, used for gas and water purification. The waste products from the purification business later became the basis for a new power generation business. Likewise, Hayleys’ transportation activities became a separate unit that led to an infrastructure business. The core business began to shift from exporting raw materials and importing finished goods to exporting value-added products. The next major step, in 1976, was the formation of a joint venture, Dipped Products Ltd. (DPL – the name refers to the manufacturing process of immersing moulds in liquid rubber) to make rubber

---

6 The war, and in particular the LTTE, claimed the lives of numerous journalists and other leading thinkers. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Notable_assassinations_of_the_Sri_Lankan_Civil_War.
gloves for export.\textsuperscript{8} Tanky’s first major assignment at Hayleys was to build DPL’s first glove manufacturing plant.

The formation of a centre-right government in 1977 led to a liberalised economy, lifting many of the socialist-style controls that had been in place for nearly two decades. Simultaneously, Hayleys elected its first Sri Lankan chairman, D.S. Jayasundera. Besides recruiting the three chairmen who succeeded him, noted Tanky, “He was responsible for inculcating the value set that has driven the company in the three decades that followed.”

The 1990s were a key decade for diversification and vertical integration. Hayleys entered the leisure business through a joint venture with a travel and hospitality firm, Jetwing Hotels.\textsuperscript{9} During the same decade, a joint venture to manufacture textiles, Hayleys MGT Knitting Mills, was created,\textsuperscript{10} as well as a subsidiary to manufacture pickles from local produce. Together with agricultural inputs, by 2008 agriculture would account for 13% of the group’s turnover.\textsuperscript{11} Hayleys’ transportation and shipping activities grew rapidly to keep pace. Rubber plantations were acquired to assure a steady supply of raw material to make gloves. DPL acquired the Kelani Valley (tea and rubber) plantations, and Hayleys purchased the Talawakelle tea plantation. In the following decade, Hayleys and its subsidiaries expanded manufacturing operations abroad, with hand protection (gloves), activated carbon and fibre plants in Thailand, Indonesia and China. By 2009, the firm had marketing offices in the US, the UK, Holland, Australia, Bangladesh, Japan and Italy, and its products were sold in 80 countries. In certain sectors, such as purification products and hand protection, Hayleys was now among the world leaders.

In Sri Lanka it had built a major social presence. Hayleys’ shipping operations managed one-eighth of the total container throughput in Colombo. With the plantations came responsibility for 100,000 workers and their dependents in the Central and Southern provinces. Hayleys’ agricultural businesses accounted for 34% of the country’s exports of fruit and vegetables (including half the bottled pickles sold in Japan) and provided inputs to 300,000 farmers. Its consumer products division operated 70,000 outlets. Even in the North, one was never far from a Hayleys business.

Management Organisation: Blending Oversight and Autonomy

The Hayleys group dealt with its operational and territorial diversity by multiplying face-to-face exchanges of information. At the board level, meetings were held every quarter to approve results, and monthly when exceptional issues required attention. The next formal tier was the Group Management Committee, consisting of 14 sector heads, seven of whom also served on the board. They met every month with Tanky, primarily to discuss financial performance, but also operational changes required by events and to formulate policy recommendations to the board. They also appointed sector managers (see Exhibit 4) outside the formal reporting structure. A CEO Forum was created to facilitate better communication between the CEO and senior and some mid-level management through open question and

\textsuperscript{8} For a recent history of DPL see case B3, “Dipped Products Ltd.: Firstlight for Suppliers”.
\textsuperscript{9} For current information see case B2, “Jetwing Hotels: Applying Corporate Responsibility to Tourism”.
\textsuperscript{10} This joint venture is described in case B1, “Hayleys MGT Knitting Mills”.
\textsuperscript{11} Annual Report 2007-8, p. 64.
answer sessions. Its quarterly meetings brought together managers nominated by the sector heads on a revolving basis to allow different people to participate.

Similar structures ensured cross-sector exchanges at different levels. Hayleys was organised into four business groups (see Exhibit 3) in which monthly management meetings were held to discuss issues like technology, work in progress, overheads, marketing, and energy management. Specialists below the sector head level participated in these meetings. There were also human resources, finance and communications clusters from across the group, which met regularly. The corporate responsibility cluster, created in 2004, was eventually merged with the communications cluster. Each sector held its own management meetings every six weeks. Tanky attended some but not all of these meetings and did not chair them so that “conversations can be freed up,” he said. This structure required a lot of time and, for some, arduous travel, but it ensured that Hayleys managers had wide contacts with their peers and access to the top of the company.

Perhaps surprisingly, the organizational structure went hand in hand with a great deal of autonomy for managers. Commenting on the sector level, Richard Ebell, Group Finance Director, explained: “We set out investments that will be made during the year. A sector has certain freedom – beyond that, they have to get approval of the board. The board relies heavily on the judgement of the sector managers.” Likewise, operational managers in different sectors spontaneously cited their autonomy, and the fact that their ideas were given a hearing and implemented by their managers, as major reasons for staying at Hayleys. Nearly half the group’s managers (48%) had been with the company for more than 10 years.

**Hayleys’ Core Values Under Pressure**

Hayleys’ stated vision was “To be Sri Lanka’s corporate inspiration at all times.” Its massive domestic presence made it an important player in society as well as business. However, Tanky acknowledged that Hayleys’ political influence had declined:

> “Fifteen to 30 years ago, we had the active support of the government. The government is helping less and less. We lost support perhaps because of the conflict situation in the North – the same focus on growth has not been kept. Government is perhaps less understanding of the needs of industry. Our ability to impact government thinking, very significant 10-15 years ago, is less now. We could be used much better.... If they’re using [our competencies for development], it has to be on a very clean basis.”

His statement was an allusion to the increasing corruption in public affairs, and the fact that Hayleys would not pay bribes. Its position was well known: in 2006, his predecessor as chairman, Rajan Yatawara, had blamed corruption for “killing” local industry in a rare public interview, and had stressed: “We don’t go behind politicians or officials but play by the

---

13 This stance is made explicit in the firm’s annual reports as well as to employees. A Hayleys executive tells how, early in his career with the firm, he reported to his boss that he could resolve a problem with a customs agent through a small payment. The boss said ironically, “Fine, as long as you pay it out of your salary.” The young man never suggested a bribe again.
Tanky commented, “We may have lost business in the short term but we believe our position is enhanced in the long term.”

The term “trust” recurred frequently and spontaneously in the conversation of Hayleys’ management, both as a corporate value and as a business tool. Certain acquisitions, like its 40% holding in Jetwing Hotels, were made in part because the board approved the character and family values of founder Herbert Cooray. Hayleys management interpreted the success in Asia and globally of Unilever, a competitor in the tea business, as being based on “trust in the products they sell,” said Tanky. Hayleys, he said, took a similar stance in its glove business:

“In hand protection, where you’re dealing with protection of people, reliability and the kind of thinking behind the organisation has a substantial valuating component for your customers, and then for their relationships with you. In the UK, people were significantly impressed that here was a country, in this part of the world, speaking this language. So we could get a slight premium over a Chinese product.”

The board, said Tanky, required that managers earn “trust in whatever you said and how you behaved”. In accordance with group policy, “all promotions are earned from within the organisation,” and scrutiny was intense at every level. Senior and junior managers socialised frequently and met in the same clubs. They adopted a similar casual style, reminiscent of engineers on worksites. Ostentatious displays of wealth were absent from their offices, while religion played a visible role in their business style: Hindu rites of welcome greeted visitors to plantations, and one executive listened to gospel music while travelling with colleagues. From the board down to the workforce, all of Sri Lanka’s principal ethnicities and religions were represented.

Especially on the plantations, but also in the tea and rubber factories, managers and executives saw themselves as “fathers” to their employees, said Kavi Seneviratne, “from the cradle to the grave.” Their role was to support (and on the plantations, manage) communities, rather than to simply run businesses. Hayleys MGT Knitting Mills likewise contributed to building roads, schools and health care facilities that benefitted thousands of people. To some extent this role had been inherited from the colonial era, but the circumstances had profoundly changed. Poverty among workers was no longer accepted at home or abroad. Hayleys employees were no longer a docile workforce. They clearly had other options, from emigration to jobs in foreign-owned firms, as well as powerful unions with political connections and international organisations to support and defend them.

---

15 Hayleys’ infrastructure division was widely rumoured to have lost at least one major public project because of its refusal to pay bribes.
From “Doing the Right Thing” to Corporate Responsibility

Inevitably, these social trends drove up costs. The impact was clear at DPL, the biggest unit in the group. Since 2004, DPL’s group turnover had grown by 246%, from LKR 4.9 billion to over 11 billion. Yet profits were under pressure from what management called “a classic example of top-line growth squeezed by burgeoning costs leading to an eroded bottom line.”\(^{17}\) Wages were a significant factor: a month-long strike at the end of 2006 led to wage increases of 32% and 48% on rubber and tea plantations, respectively.\(^{18}\) Less apparently, a second major cost driver, the price of latex, had a strong social component. DPL depended, for a majority of its latex supplies, on thousands of small farmers in the Central and Eastern districts of Sri Lanka. That supply base was eyed enviously by Hayleys’ competitors. Loss of it “would be catastrophic for us,” said DPL Managing Director, J.A.G. Anandarajah.

Hayleys was thus moving towards addressing the social needs of key stakeholders well before it began to use the term “corporate responsibility”. Its first key tool was the firm’s reputation for trustworthiness, which it used to engage with stakeholders like smallholder farmers. Rizvi Zaheed, who ran Hayleys’ agricultural businesses, noted that in recruiting farmers as suppliers, “trust is a critical factor.” Besides supporting capacity-building programmes like school construction and personal “empowerment” skills training, Hayleys provided loans at reasonable rates and training in the use of agricultural inputs to farmers. The company also supported “the right of our suppliers to join unions and bargain collectively,” said Tanky.

In 2004, when Hayleys decided to make corporate responsibility a focus across the group, such internal practices and experiences formed the backbone of the initiative. But despite widespread support from managers, there remained major unknowns. For example, although Hayleys and its operating units had obtained international certification for many of their products, and environmental and management practices (see Exhibit 5), they had not been subjected to intense scrutiny from the global media. Why and how would anyone take the word of a company from a country caught in a deadly conflict that it was serious about corporate responsibility? Would operational managers support it? Not least, how would the firm pay for it? What could Tanky say to his shareholders when they asked him about the costs and profits of the policy? Four years after the policy initiative had begun, Tanky believed his people could give him the answers.

\(^{17}\) Ibid., p. 35.
\(^{18}\) The strike also led to a loss of 10% of production of tea in 2007. However, rising global tea prices due to falling supplies enabled higher revenues for 2007. See Kelani Valley PLC Annual Report 2007, p. 3.
## Exhibit 1

Selected Financial Data, 2003-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Figures in US$ Million</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group turnover</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit before tax</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxation</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit after tax</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority interest</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit attributable to Hayleys PLC</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Figures in LKR million</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group turnover</td>
<td>31 327</td>
<td>27 639</td>
<td>24 012</td>
<td>19 445</td>
<td>15 503</td>
<td>12 510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit before tax</td>
<td>1 555</td>
<td>1 608</td>
<td>1 484</td>
<td>1 879</td>
<td>1 370</td>
<td>1 262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxation</td>
<td>(465)</td>
<td>(519)</td>
<td>(504)</td>
<td>(470)</td>
<td>(309)</td>
<td>(294)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit after tax</td>
<td>1 090</td>
<td>1 089</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>1 409</td>
<td>1 061</td>
<td>969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority interest</td>
<td>(637)</td>
<td>(556)</td>
<td>(394)</td>
<td>(635)</td>
<td>(402)</td>
<td>(360)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit attributable to Hayleys PLC</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Capitalisation</td>
<td>7 331</td>
<td>10 650</td>
<td>7 388</td>
<td>8 438</td>
<td>5 750</td>
<td>5 625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange rate (SLR/US$)</td>
<td>110.37</td>
<td>105.81</td>
<td>101.34</td>
<td>101.81</td>
<td>96.76</td>
<td>95.78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Exhibit 2
Contribution by Sector to EBIDTA (in %), 2007-8

Contribution by sector

- Fibre 8%
- Hand protection 18%
- Purification products 12%
- Agri products (food) 3%
- Plantations (rubber, tea) 14%
- Transportation 21%
- Agri inputs 8%
- Consumer product (distribution) 5%
- Industry inputs 4%
- Power and energy <1%
- Textiles 3%
- Travel 1%

Source: Hayleys PLC Annual Report 2007-8 except where otherwise noted

Note: Hand protection (DPL’s main activity) accounted for 29% of Hayleys’ turnover. Its relatively weak contribution to EBIDTA was due to the weakening exchange rate of the Sri Lankan Rupee in 2008.
Exhibit 3

Contribution by Business Groups to EBITDA, 2007-8

Exhibit 4
Hayleys PLC Reporting Structure

Key:
- MA& SRD: Management Audit & systems Review Department
- SBDU: Strategic Business Development Unit
- CAU: Corporate Affairs Unit
### Exhibit 5

**Accreditations of Hayleys’ Units**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accreditation</th>
<th>Companies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISO 9001 (quality management)</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISO 14000 (environment)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest Stewardship Council (environment)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISO 22000:2005 (food)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HACCP (food)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRC (food)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA 8000 (ethical and social practices)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To order INSEAD case studies please contact one of the three distributors below:

**ecch, UK and USA**

ecch UK Registered Office:  
www.ecch.com  
Tel: +44 (0)1234 750903  
Fax: +44 (0)1234 751125  
E-mail: ecch@ecch.com

ecch USA Registered Office:  
www.ecch.com  
Tel: +1 781 239 5884  
Fax: +1 781 239 5885  
E-mail: ecchusa@ecch.com

**Centrale de Cas et de Médias Pédagogiques**

www.ccmp-publishing.com  
Tel: 33 (0) 1.49.23.57.25  
Fax: 33 (0) 1.49.23.57.41  
E-mail: ccmp@ccip.fr

INSEAD

Boulevard de Constance, 77305 Fontainebleau Cedex, France.  
Tel: 33 (0) 1 60 72 40 00 Fax: 33 (0) 1 60 74 55 00/01 www.insead.edu

1 Ayer Rajah Avenue, Singapore 138676  
Tel: 65 6799 5388 Fax: 65 6799 5399

Printed by INSEAD